To Shape a World Like Us

“Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny” by Joshua Muravchik

Reviewed by Stephanie Abbajay

The end of the Cold War has initiated a spirited debate over what course American foreign policy should follow.

Pat Buchanan believes that America should now "come home," Jeane Kirkpatrick that it should behave like "a normal country in a normal time," Irving Kristol that the traditional concept of national interest should be our guide. Others, however, take a more expansive view of things and argue that America should press its new advantage as the victor of the superpower conflict – not to conquer but to convert.

The most thoughtful and stimulating of this last group is Joshua Muravchik, and in "Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny," he defines what the president has so far been unable to: The "new world order" is to be a world made over in our own image, a world of American-inspired democratic states.

Mr. Muravchik believes America must export democracy for both moral and selfish reasons – out of empathy with our fellow humans and because a world that looks like us will also be safer for us. Mr. Muravchik calls this "democratic idealism." Ben Wattenberg, another vocal advocate, calls it "neo-manifest destinarianism." Opponents, on the other hand, prefer "democratic triumphalism" or "democratic imperialism."

Mr. Muravchik acknowledges that the appeal of exporting democracy rests largely on the profound success of installing democracy in Germany and Japan after World War II. Total destruction of the pre-existing political order and lengthy occupation of those countries laid fertile ground for American efforts.

But can democracy be exported without force and occupation? Mr. Muravchik says yes: We can export ideas and information and it can be done by the pen, the radio and the pamphlet – through the United States Information Agency, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Agency for International Development, cultural and educational exchanges, foreign aid and better use of diplomacy.

In order to establish this case, Mr. Muravchik must prove that democratic idealism is superior to other foreign policies. He briskly dismisses pacifism and isolationism (which he views as "selfish and foolhardy") and directs his critical ammunition mainly against the doctrine of realism, which emphasizes the role of power and self-interest in international affairs.

After a thorough review of the realist school (whose proponents include George Kennan and Henry Kissinger) and neo-realism (Irving Kristol and Robert Tucker, among others), Mr. Muravchik concludes that realism is doomed by a fatal contradiction: If, as realists insist, states behave as geography and human nature ordain they must, if everything is determined, then "why criticize and why prescribe?"

Realism is an uncertain guide to policy because its advocates can never reach a consensus on what constitutes vital interests, and therefore, because interests shift, a foreign policy based on realpolitik is variable and unpredictable. Democratic idealism has no such failings: It is based on a few simple principles that have universal application, and therefore no shifting interests.

Mr. Muravchik firmly believes that democracy can be exported. Though the growth of democracy is subject to certain cultural, intellectual, social and political circumstances, and though it helps if they already exist in a country, "these circumstances are manifestly subject to external influence" – that is, they can be created by us.

But though he tries, Mr. Muravchik is unable to provide a convincing example of the successful export of democracy through these peaceful means. Latin America? Hardly. As for Eastern Europe, he is correct in that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty played a major role in discrediting communism. But it remains to be seen whether such organizations can play a decisive role in establishing democracy in the region.
It is almost certainly true that a more democratic world would be safer and more peaceful and therefore better for America. And Mr. Muravchik's policy prescriptions are unobjectionable, for really he does little more than ask for a continuation of programs already in existence. But, in other respects, democratic idealism poses problems. Indeed, what is sauce for the realist goose is also sauce for Mr. Muravchik's gander; and when the standards he applies to realism are applied to his own approach, serious flaws appear.

In order to avoid a "self-defeating" democratic idealism, Mr. Muravchik says we must be "realistic" about where to export democracy. But once the democratic crusade becomes discriminating (as it should), it is open to the same charges of inconsistency and double standards that Mr. Muravchik levels against realism. Mr. Muravchik goes on at length about the necessity of broadcasting Radio Marti to Cuba and the Voice of America to China, but he says nothing of non-democratic but strategically placed regimes that are our allies (like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait).

Mr. Muravchik is right. America is a great force for good in the world and democracy is the best system of government. But beyond the force of example, care and modesty, along with careful consideration of the likely success of a project, are appropriate.

Unfortunately, Mr. Muravchik fails to convince that the peaceful agents of democracy can in any successful way establish its growth abroad. As he illustrates, the most successful means of exporting democracy are force and occupation – as in postwar Japan and Germany, where American occupying forces were presented with a virtual tabula rasa. However, absent this opportunity, democracy is largely a do-it-yourself project.

Stephanie Abbajay is managing editor of the National Interest.